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PEDIGREE PROSECUTION: SHOULD A HEAD OF
STATE’S FAMILY MEMBERS BE ENTITLED TO
IMMUNITY IN FOREIGN COURTS?
Yena Hong*
States tread carefully in international affairs to maintain mutual respect
for sovereignty. In today’s legal order, a head of state is the sovereign state
personified. Until the twentieth century, heads of state did not routinely
travel outside of their respective domains. Consequently, mutual respect for
foreign sovereigns was usually implemented in national courts by
recognition of immunity for diplomats and public vessels—paradigmatically,
warships. Today, heads of state often travel to other countries, and it is
increasingly accepted as customary international law that a head of state
cannot be sued or prosecuted in a foreign court on the basis of any of his or
her acts, public or private. To permit such prosecution or litigation would
invite reciprocal retaliation and ultimately risk a breakdown of relations
between the countries involved.
But should a head of state’s family members also have absolute immunity
in foreign countries, particularly for private acts with no plausible
connection to official functions? Despite progress in crystallizing the scope
of customary international law of head-of-state immunity, there is scant
discussion regarding the international law basis of immunity for members of
a head of state’s family. Some states have invoked the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) to grant head-of-state family members
“diplomatic immunity” from local prosecution or litigation. Such action
seems plausible when, for instance, first ladies or other family members are
accompanying heads of state on official visits or are themselves performing
an official act in visiting a foreign nation. Yet, there are many instances
involving a head of state’s family members in foreign countries that have
nothing to do with official business—such as sightseeing, shopping, or
studying. In many notable cases involving similar personal business, host
nations have accorded a head of state’s family members immunity for the
sake of diplomacy, though they often invoke a legal basis like the VCDR.

* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Fordham University School of Law; B.A., 2013, University of
Pennsylvania. I would like to thank Professor Thomas H. Lee for his time, guidance, and
wisdom throughout the process of writing this Note. I also wish to thank Immanuel E. Kim
and my friends for their continuing encouragement, and my mother for her unconditional love
and support in all that I do.
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This Note distinguishes between two types of immunity for a head of state’s
family members: absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity
ratione materiae. On the one hand, absolute immunity ratione personae
covers both private and official acts that a state official commits during his
or her term in office. Qualified immunity ratione materiae, on the other hand,
covers only those acts that are official and not private. This Note proposes
that the international community should limit foreign immunity for a head of
state’s family members to qualified immunity ratione materiae. There will
often be compelling reasons to allow a head of state’s family member to exit
and escape prosecution or litigation for private acts. There is, however, no
legal basis for immunity in such cases, and suggesting that there is only
serves to dilute head-of-state immunity more generally and wreak havoc in
the development of relevant international law.
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INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, August 12, 2017, Gabriella Engels, a South African model,
went to the Taboo nightclub in Sandton, Gauteng, South Africa, with her two
girlfriends.1 While at the nightclub, another of Engels’s friends introduced
the women to Chatunga Bellarmine Mugabe and his brother Robert Mugabe
Jr.,2 who are the sons of Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe and

1. Khanyi Ndabeni, First Lady Grace Mugabe ‘Was Ready to Murder,’ SUNDAY TIMES
(Aug. 20, 2017, 12:02 AM), https://www.timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/news/2017-08-19first-lady-grace-mugabe-was-ready-to-murder/ [https://perma.cc/YT7L-PL8N] (“Engels and
her two friends were celebrating a 21st birthday.”).
2. Id.
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first lady Grace Mugabe.3 Engels and her two girlfriends left the nightclub
after getting into an argument with some acquaintances of the Mugabe
brothers.4
According to news reports, the next day, Engels’s friend apologized for the
previous night’s argument and invited the three women to come by the
Capital 20 West, a hotel in Sandton.5 This was the same hotel at which the
Mugabe brothers were staying,6 but the three women had no interaction with
them that day.7 Fifteen minutes after Engels and her two girlfriends arrived
at a room in the hotel, Grace Mugabe stormed into the room to look for her
two sons.8 Instead, Grace Mugabe found Engels and confronted her about
the whereabouts of her sons.9 When Engels could not give her an answer,
Grace Mugabe proceeded to whip Engels with an extension cord.10 The
attack lasted approximately twenty minutes,11 during which Grace Mugabe’s
ten bodyguards stood by and watched.12 Engels needed fourteen stitches to
close up the gashes on her face and her scalp caused by Grace Mugabe’s
assault.13

3. Id. Zimbabwe’s former President Robert Mugabe resigned on Tuesday, November
21, 2017, ending his “37 years of autocratic rule, finally succumbing to the pressure of a
military takeover and the humiliation of impeachment.” David McKenzie et al., Robert
Mugabe Resigns After 37 Years as Zimbabwe’s Leader, CNN (Nov. 21, 2017, 6:16 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/21/africa/robert-mugabe-resigns-zimbabwepresident/index.html [https://perma.cc/9UA7-LLZM].
4. Ndabeni, supra note 1.
5. Id. It is unclear who this “friend” was who apologized to Engels and her two
girlfriends. The three women had also left behind a jacket when they left the Taboo nightclub
the previous night, and this same “friend” invited the women to the hotel to return the jacket.
Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. (“‘We had no interaction with the Mugabe brothers at all on Sunday,’ said Engels’s
friend. ‘We were literally there for 15 minutes. The only thing we managed to do was smoke
a cigarette on the balcony. Then our friend asked us to turn off the music. Someone important
was coming.’”). See generally Jan Bornman, Exclusive: Pictures Reveal Inside Story of Grace
Mugabe’s Hotel Rampage, TIMES LIVE (Aug. 22, 2017, 1:55 PM),
https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-22-exclusive-pictures-reveal-insidestory-of-grace-mugabes-hotel-rampage/ [https://perma.cc/LNX7-E3HK] (explaining that the
bodyguards of Grace Mugabe’s two sons were the ones who informed her of their disruptive
behavior at the hotel).
9. Ndabeni, supra note 1.
10. Id. (“‘She dragged me by my hair and held me tight. She slashed me viciously with
the electrical cord. She then dragged me by my hair across the floor and threw me on a couch
where she forced me to call our mutual friend and Bellarmine’s best friend, but their phones
were off. She continued beating me with the cord; I was rescued by the hotel manager, who
rushed to the room after hearing my screams for help.’”).
11. Id.
12. Jeffrey Moyo, Zimbabwe’s First Lady Said to Seek Diplomatic Immunity over Assault
Claim, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/africa/
grace-mugabe-model.html [https://perma.cc/HPS4-FJ4M].
13. Jane Flanagan, ‘I Thought I Was Going to Die’: Young Model Tells of Terror as Blood
Streamed Down Her Face After ‘Raging Robert Mugabe’s Wife Savagely Beat Her with an
Electric Plug,’ DAILY MAIL (Aug. 16, 2017, 2:49 AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article-4793626/I-thought-going-die-Model-tells-terror.html [perma.cc/8YLC-3XZQ].
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At the Sandton police station the following day, Engels filed “a case of
assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm” against Grace Mugabe.14
Grace Mugabe was expected to appear in South African court the next day,
but she was not arrested and did not surrender herself to South African
police.15 The South African police minister, Fikile Mbalula, placed the
border police on “red alert” in an attempt to prevent Grace Mugabe from
leaving the country.16 Nevertheless, she was able to flee South Africa on an
Air Zimbabwe plane, scot-free.17
Grace Mugabe was not a diplomatic agent on an official mission to South
Africa, nor was she acting in an official capacity as a state official when she
whipped Engels and left her with gashes. Grace Mugabe was acting in her
private function as a mother of two misbehaving adult sons.18 Yet, South
Africa’s Foreign Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane stated that she had
granted Grace Mugabe diplomatic immunity “in the interests of South
Africa.”19 South Africa’s government extended Grace Mugabe the privilege
of avoiding its criminal jurisdiction through the guise of “diplomatic
immunity” to protect the wife of a regional ally’s leader from prosecution
rather than “enforc[e] international and domestic criminal law.”20
While customary international law governs the immunity of a head of state
or state official,21 the source of immunity of members of a head of state’s

14. Nico Gous, Alleged Grace Mugabe Assault Victim Offered Blank Cheque, TIMES LIVE
(Aug. 17, 2017, 5:09 PM), https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-08-17alleged-grace-mugabe-assault-victim-offered-blank-cheque/ [https://perma.cc/9RND-RJVH].
15. Id.
16. Matthew Weaver, South African Police Issue ‘Red Alert’ to Stop Grace Mugabe from
Leaving, GUARDIAN (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:12 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/
aug/17/south-africa-police-red-alert-grace-mugabe-zimbabwe
[https://perma.cc/ZG8CY2GD].
17. Associated Press, Grace Mugabe Flies Home to Zimbabwe with Diplomatic Immunity,
GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2017, 2:12 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/
grace-mugabe-granted-diplomatic-immunity-after-alleged-attack
[https://perma.cc/RTH5XB3U].
18. See infra Part II.B. Grace Mugabe’s two sons are infamous for their misbehavior. See
Frank Chikowore, Watch: Mugabe’s Son Exposes Lavish Lifestyle in a Video, NEWS24 (Aug.
12, 2017, 7:36 AM), http://www.news24.com/Africa/Zimbabwe/watch-mugabes-sonexposes-lavish-lifestyle-in-a-video-20170812 [https://perma.cc/BU7F-GDZV] (“Chatunga
and his brother Robert Jnr were known for partying and were recently kicked out of a luxurious
apartment in the leafy suburb of Sandton in Johannesburg for their ‘unacceptable behavior.’”);
Govan Whittles & Simon Allison, Zim’s Disgraceful First Family, MAIL & GUARDIAN (Aug.
18, 2017, 12:00 AM), https://mg.co.za/article/2017-08-18-00-zims-disgraceful-first-family
[https://perma.cc/AJ3N-8LSB] (“The brothers, who [do not] work, live in a Sandton apartment
(they were kicked out of another one in April after being involved in a violent brawl. That
one reportedly cost them more than R70 000 a month). They are regulars in Jo’burg’s most
upmarket clubs, where they order top-end alcohol and pick up the tab for entourages of up to
20 people. . . . They know . . . rules [do not] apply to them.”).
19. See Jeffrey Moyo, Grace Mugabe Wins Diplomatic Immunity After Assault
Accusations, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/20/world/
africa/grace-mugabe-assault-model.html [https://perma.cc/4EHB-N9KN].
20. Id.
21. See Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur on Immunity of State Officials
from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction), Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/601 (May 29, 2008).
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family is international comity.22 “International comity,” in the relevant
sense, is deference to foreign sovereigns beyond what is plainly required by
law.23 This deference is an essential feature of harmonious relations among
nations.24 However, such deference should not extend to immunity for
family members of a head of state’s family for acts that were committed in a
private capacity without any connection to official duties. To say or even to
imply that such immunity applies as a matter of law risks undermining the
important function that head-of-state immunity plays in international affairs
by divorcing it entirely from functional justification.
This Note asserts that while heads of state are entitled to absolute immunity
ratione personae,25 their family members are entitled to qualified immunity
ratione materiae26: immunity for official functions only. The following
discussion supporting this assertion proceeds in three Parts. Part I explores
the concepts of absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity
ratione materiae as they apply to the immunities of a head of state and a
diplomatic agent of the state. Part II presents case studies reflecting how
states have both limited and granted immunity to family members of heads
of state. Part III proposes that immunity should not be granted to members
of a head of state’s family for acts that do not fall within the curtilage of headof-state functions, and it explains that not extending such immunity will
neither hamper head-of-state functions nor undermine the sovereignty of the
affected state.
I. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATIONE MATERIAE
OF A HEAD OF STATE AND A DIPLOMATIC AGENT
Treaties govern diplomatic and consular immunities, but customary
international law is the source for immunity of heads of state and other state
officials from foreign jurisdiction.27 For a practice to be established as
customary international law, the practice must be widespread and uniform
among the states, and states must believe that the practice is mandatory as a
matter of law—that is, opinio juris.28 Once a practice is established as
customary international law, “it is universally binding on all states” that do
not persistently object to the practice.29

22. See id. para. 36; see also infra note 126 and accompanying text.
23. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, paras. 35–36.
24. See, e.g., Michael A. Tunks, Diplomats or Defendants?: Defining the Future of Headof-State Immunity, 52 DUKE L.J. 651, 657 n.31 (2002).
25. See infra Part I.A. Absolute immunity ratione personae, often known as personal
immunity, covers both private and official acts that a state official commits during his or her
term in office. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 79.
26. See infra Part I.A. Qualified immunity ratione materiae, often known as functional
immunity, covers only those acts that a state official performs in his or her official capacity.
Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 80.
27. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 33 (“The fact that the source of immunity from foreign
jurisdiction is customary international law is noted in rulings of national courts.”).
28. JOHN H. CURRIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, AND THEORY 121
(2007).
29. Id. at 120.
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The doctrine of immunity, however, originated from the concept of
sovereignty in a domestic context.30 When French philosopher Jean Bodin
coined the term “sovereignty” in 1576, his definition embraced the idea that
“kings were sovereign within their territories” (i.e., the highest authority),
with only God as superior to the king.31 As sovereign nations formed and
interacted with each other in early modern Europe, the idea developed an
international dimension—“a sovereign became immune within his territory
and without.”32 The rationale for sovereign immunity “was expressed in the
maxim par in parem non habet imperium: equals cannot exercise authority
over each other.”33 Over time, sovereign immunity became “generally
referred to as state immunity”34 but the underlying rationale remained the
same.35 Thus, state immunity has served as a doctrine to protect a state’s
sovereignty by preventing other states from subjecting its property or
interests to lawsuits in their own domestic courts.36
Questions of sovereign immunity in foreign courts were initially presented
in lawsuits involving diplomats (e.g., ambassadors and consuls) and public
property, such as ships.37 In the age of sail, heads of state did not travel
abroad, or, at least, they did not travel to foreign jurisdictions where they
might potentially be sued.38 A diplomatic representative had immunity under
the theory that “diplomats acting on behalf of a sovereign state embody the
ruler of that state.”39 It followed that the ruler him or herself was, as the
personification of the state, necessarily immune from legal proceedings in a
foreign court.40
At first, immunity with respect to foreign officials was based on his or her
personal status—absolute immunity ratione personae.41 However, as the
international community moved to the “restrictive” view of state immunity

30. See YITIHA SIMBEYE, IMMUNITY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 93 (2004).
31. Id. at 93 n.10.
32. Id. at 93; see also id. at 105–06 (explaining a king’s absolute immunity).
33. Id. at 93.
34. See id.
35. Brian Man-ho Chok, Let the Responsible Be Responsible: Judicial Oversight and
Over-Optimism in the Arrest Warrant Case and the Fall of the Head of State Immunity
Doctrine in International and Domestic Courts, 30 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 489, 496 (2015)
(“[T]he rationale for state immunity originates from the idea of par in parem non habet
imperium.”).
36. See ROSANNE VAN ALEBEEK, THE IMMUNITY OF STATES AND THEIR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 67 (2008).
37. See generally The Schooner Exch. v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
38. Cf. Stephen L. Wright, Diplomatic Immunity: A Proposal for Amending the Vienna
Convention to Deter Violent Criminal Acts, 5 B.U. INT’L L.J. 177, 194 n.99 (1987) (explaining
that monarchs sent diplomats as a primary means of communication between states, but a
given monarch would be reluctant to “send its diplomats abroad without immunity because its
absence would permit other powers to interfere with the diplomat’s conduct and thus hinder
his ability to communicate”).
39. Mitchell S. Ross, Rethinking Diplomatic Immunity: A Review of Remedial
Approaches to Address the Abuses of Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities, 4 AM. U. J. INT’L
L. & POL’Y 173, 177 (1989).
40. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94.
41. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE § 12.3 (Sir Ivor Roberts ed., 6th ed. 2009).
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doctrine,42 the basis for granting jurisdictional immunity shifted from
absolute immunity ratione personae to qualified immunity ratione
materiae—functional immunity that attaches only to the extent that the
immunity-holder is performing an official function.43
This Part explores functional immunity as it applies to the immunity of a
head of state and a diplomatic agent. Part I.A examines the difference
between absolute immunity ratione personae and qualified immunity ratione
materiae and discusses acts that are covered by the latter. Part I.B outlines
how qualified immunity ratione materiae applies in granting a head of state
immunity to ensure that the official functions of the head of state are not
impeded and that respect for state sovereignty is maintained. Part I.C then
explains how qualified immunity ratione materiae applies in granting
diplomatic immunity to ensure that the official functions of the diplomatic
agent are not impeded.
A. Two Types of Immunity: Absolute Immunity Ratione Personae
and Qualified Immunity Ratione Materiae
There are two types of immunity for heads of states and diplomats:
immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae.44 The oldest
type of immunity that exists is immunity ratione personae, and it is
absolute.45 It relates to the individual46 as it “attaches to the person in
question by virtue of [his or her] office.”47 Immunity ratione personae is
absolute in that it covers “acts performed by a State official in both an official
and a private capacity, both before and while occupying his [or her] post.”48
Such immunity is temporary in character; it only “becomes effective when
the official takes up his [or her] post and ceases when he [or she] leaves [the]

42. See Tunks, supra note 24, at 655. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
there was a clear boundary between acts of a state and those of private citizens in commerce
because “states tended to stay away from private acts of trade and commerce.” SIMBEYE, supra
note 30, at 97. As states became increasingly involved in trade over time, this line became
blurred as “acts that belonged to the private sphere . . . were now being attributed to the state.”
Id. As a result, a state’s “[a]bsolute immunity became . . . increasingly inappropriate” as it
placed governmental organizations in an “extremely unfair position” over private citizens. Id.
During the twentieth century, “to ensure that commercial governmental agencies and private
citizens were placed on an equal footing,” states applied the restrictive state-immunity doctrine
to determine which state acts were entitled to immunity. Id. Under the restrictive stateimmunity doctrine, a state’s public acts (acts jure imperii) were entitled to immunity, while a
state’s private acts (acts jure gestionis) were not. Id. By the middle of the twentieth century,
states in Western Europe, except the United Kingdom, applied the restrictive state-immunity
doctrine in civil cases. See id. at 97–98 (describing the gradual adoption of the restrictive stateimmunity doctrine by Austria, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European
Convention on State Immunity, and the International Law Commission).
43. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 12.3 (“[I]mmunity ratione materiae
is restricted to acts performed in the exercise of the functions of the office on behalf of the
State.”).
44. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 109.
45. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 78.
46. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 109.
47. Id. at 110.
48. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 79.
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post.”49 As a result, a state official can be held accountable for his or her
private acts once he or she ceases to hold office.50 But during the official’s
tenure, the official cannot be sued or prosecuted.
Immunity ratione materiae, also known as functional immunity or
qualified immunity in U.S. legal parlance,51 protects state officials with
respect to acts “performed in fulfilment of functions of the State.”52 Such
immunity is necessary so that states cannot exercise jurisdiction over foreign
officials to impede the performance of government functions.53 This sort of
qualified immunity attaches in domestic and foreign courts.
Qualified immunity ratione materiae, in theory, flows from the concept of
state immunity because “only acts that ‘human beings in their capacity as
organs of the State’ perform manifest the legal existence of a State.”54
Therefore, to qualify as an act covered by qualified immunity ratione
materiae, the act must be “official.”55
Under modern customary international law, there are two tests for
determining whether a state official’s act is “official”: the “presumed
apparent authority” test and the “personal motive” test.56 The “presumed
apparent authority” test relies on the apparent authority a state has given to
its official;57 the “personal motive” test turns on the state official’s
underlying motive for performing an act.58 Under the “personal motive” test,
“acts ‘performed exclusively to satisfy a personal interest’ prevent” a state
official from claiming immunity ratione materiae.59
The International Law Commission (the “Commission”), a United Nations
organ created to advise on the development of international law, recognizes
that the concepts of immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione
materiae are useful in demonstrating the immunity of state officials.60 This
Note uses these terms to discuss immunity as it extends to members of a head
49. Id.
50. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 126.
51. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
52. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 80; see also Chok, supra note 35, at 497 (explaining
that immunity ratione materiae “applies when the impugned acts are conducted under the
authority of a sovereign, independent of whether the individuals are in office”).
53. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 95 (“The functional . . . rationale for the immunity
of State officials is . . . a direct rationale. One State, in exercising its criminal jurisdiction over
officials of another State, may not hamper the performance by those officials of their
government functions, interfere with activities related to the performance of those functions,
or create obstacles to the activities of persons representing the other State in its international
relations . . . .”).
54. Chok, supra note 35, at 498 (quoting HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 358 (2d ed. 1966)).
55. Id. at 499.
56. Id. at 499–500.
57. Id. (“The mandate and directions that a State gives to its officials determine the official
nature of an official’s act.”).
58. Id. at 500.
59. Id. (quoting Institut de Droit International [IDI], Immunities from Jurisdiction and
Execution of Heads of State and of Government in International Law art. 13, para. 2 (Aug. 26,
2001), http://www.idi-iil.org/app/uploads/2017/06/2001_van_02_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EZ2C-KFYX]).
60. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 83.
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of state’s family, although the argument herein proposes qualified immunity
ratione materiae as the doctrinal rubric for such family members.
B. The Absolute Immunity of a Head of State
Head-of-state61 immunity is derived from state immunity62 or sovereign
immunity.63 Because a head of state had been generally considered a
personification of the state,64 “many countries felt no practical need to
distinguish between head-of-state immunity and state sovereign
immunity.”65 So, like a state, a head of state had absolute immunity for “acts
committed either in a public or a private capacity.”66 However, state
immunity and head-of-state immunity began to diverge into separate legal
doctrines as the international community adopted the restrictive stateimmunity doctrine.67 As state immunity went from being absolute to
restricted, it became unclear whether head-of-state immunity would follow
the same trend or, more specifically, what the extent of head-of-state
immunity would be.68
Because head-of-state immunity inheres in a person, it involves a
complication: a head of state may act in his or her official capacity or in his
or her private capacity.69 Heads of state act in their official capacity when
they “act in line with their state’s position in a given subject matter, or act
within th[eir] state’s given boundaries for action.”70 Such official acts are
entitled to immunity under any theory.71

61. Heads of state include reigning sovereigns, such as in the United Kingdom, or heads
of government, such as in the United States. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94 n.17.
62. Compare Shobha Varughese George, Head-of-State Immunity in the United States
Courts: Still Confused After All These Years, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1051, 1056 (1995) (stating
that “sovereign immunity for states and heads-of-state immunity were considered one and the
same because the head-of-state was considered to be the equivalent of the state”), with
SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 n.15 (arguing that state immunity and head-of-state immunity
are not the same and that head-of-state immunity is better understood as “a by-product of state
immunity” because a head of state “can only be accorded immunity emanating from his state’s
immunity”), and Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity:
The Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 171 (1986) (explaining that both headof-state immunity and sovereign immunity originate from a common source but have “evolved
into separate legal constructs”).
63. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 (“State immunity grew from this personal immunity of
the sovereign.”).
64. Gilbert Sison, A King No More: The Impact of the Pinochet Decision on the Doctrine
of Head of State Immunity, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 1583, 1584 (2000); see also SIMBEYE, supra
note 30, at 94.
65. Tunks, supra note 24, at 655.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. (“[A]s the international community moved toward a restrictive form of sovereign
immunity, stripping away a state’s immunity for private or commercial acts, it became unclear
whether the doctrine of head-of-state immunity would follow that course as well, or whether
international law would preserve a greater degree of personal inviolability for world leaders.”).
69. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 126–27.
70. Id. at 128.
71. See supra Part I.A.
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Due to competing policy concerns, there is a divergence of opinion in
customary international law72 with respect to head-of-state immunity for
private acts.73 On the one hand are policies concerning the interests of
justice—for instance, holding a head of state accountable for violations of
international human rights in his or her own country.74 On the other hand are
policies concerning sovereign equality and the functional necessity of headof-state immunity.75 One view is that a head of state traveling in his or her
private capacity is “not then acting as [a] representative of a sovereign state”
and is therefore “not entitled to any exemptions from the authority and
jurisdiction of the local state.”76 Another view is that a head of state “is at
all times in some degree representing [the] state,” so a head of state should
always be entitled to the same privileges and immunities that he or she is
entitled to when appearing in an official capacity to avoid interference in
fulfilling the head-of-state function.77
The international community continues to address the scope of head-ofstate immunity. At its fifty-eighth session in 2006, the Commission
embarked on a mission to add clarity to the extent of head-of-state
immunity.78 A preliminary report prepared by Special Rapporteur Roman
Anatolevich Kolodkin and subsequent reports addressing the topic of
72. “Customary international law” is a principle that is “widely accepted by the
international community and generally regarded as giving rise to legal obligations.” Mallory,
supra note 62, at 176–77.
73. 1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 454 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts
eds., 9th ed. 1992). The Commission embraces the notion that heads of state are entitled to
absolute immunity under absolute immunity ratione personae, which essentially encompasses
qualified immunity ratione materiae. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 82; Mallory, supra
note 62, at 177 (“While a survey of the international community’s approach to head of state
immunity reveals wide agreement that heads of state are entitled to some immunity, there is
no consensus on the extent of that immunity.”); Tunks, supra note 24, at 655 (“[N]ations began
thinking about head-of-state immunity as a distinct legal concept, and recognized the need to
reconsider the extent to which the goals of sovereign equality and functional necessity together
could justify exempting heads of state from judicial process abroad.”); see also Mallory, supra
note 62, at 177–78 (describing the varying methods states have employed in determining when
to grant head-of-state immunity, which further illustrates the lack of agreement among states
as to the degree of head-of-state immunity that should be granted).
74. Tunks, supra note 24, at 656 (explaining that the end of the twentieth century saw an
increasing effort by the international community to protect against human rights violations,
which motivated states to “whittle away at the shield of immunity historically enjoyed by
heads of state”). See generally R. v. Bartle, Ex parte Pinochet [1999] 38 ILM 581 (HL) (appeal
taken from Eng.) (holding that Chile’s ex-dictator, General Augusto Pinochet, was not entitled
to head-of-state immunity for his acts that violated the 1984 Convention on Torture); Beth
Stephens, The Modern Common Law of Foreign Official Immunity, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2669
(2011) (discussing cases that have considered violations of international human rights norms
in denying foreign officials immunity).
75. See Tunks, supra note 24, at 655–56.
76. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 454.
77. See id.
78. See Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 445, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006) (explaining that
it would be better for the Commission to limit its discussion of the scope of immunity granted
to state officials to heads of state and government and ministers for foreign affairs); id. at 442–
43 (explaining that the Commission’s discussion of the scope of immunity granted to state
officials should only cover a state official’s immunity from domestic and criminal
jurisdiction).
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“Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction” have
consistently recognized that heads of state enjoy absolute immunity ratione
personae.79 The Commission’s most recent reports, however, evidence its
consideration of imposing limitations or exceptions to a head of state’s
absolute immunity ratione personae as it is applied in foreign criminal
jurisdiction.80 Thus, formulating the degree of immunity awarded to heads
of state is still a work in progress.81
In the preliminary report prepared by Kolodkin, the Commission
considered whether the scope of head-of-state immunity extends to the family
members of a head of state, but Kolodkin asserted that this subject was
outside the Commission’s mandate.82 In its limited discussion of the
immunity granted to family members of a head of state, the Commission
noted that, in both doctrine and practice, the source of granting immunity to
family members of a senior official, such as a head of state, is not
international law but international comity.83 Furthermore, such immunity
could only be absolute immunity ratione personae in nature.84 The
Commission also found that one common basis upon which immunity had
been extended to head-of-state family members in the past was that the family
members were part of a head of state’s immediate family.85 Since
mentioning it in the preliminary report, no subsequent report by the
Commission on the topic of “Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
79. See Concepción Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Fifth Report on Immunity
of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 19(f), U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/701
(June 14, 2016) [hereinafter Hernández, Fifth Report]; Concepción Escobar Hernández
(Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal
Jurisdiction, para. 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/686 (May 29, 2015); Concepción Escobar
Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on the Immunity of State Officials from Foreign
Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 112, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/673 (June 2, 2014); Concepción Escobar
Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Immunity of State Officials from
Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 58, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/661 (Apr. 4, 2013); Concepción
Escobar Hernández (Special Rapporteur), Preliminary Report on the Immunity of State
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/654 (May 31,
2012); Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur), Third Report on Immunity of State
Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 19, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/646 (May 24,
2011); Roman Anatolevich Kolodkin (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on Immunity of
State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, para. 35, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/631 (June 10,
2010); Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 78. Kolodkin’s preliminary report includes heads of
state in its definition of state officials in its discussion of immunity for state officials from the
criminal jurisdiction of foreign states. Id. para. 106.
80. Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n, at 163–64, U.N. Doc. A/72/10 (2017) (“The
Commission had before it the fifth report of the Special Rapporteur analysing the question of
limitations and exceptions to the immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction
(A/CN.4/701), which it had begun to debate at its sixty-eighth session.”); Hernández, Fifth
Report, supra note 79, para. 235 (“The goal is to determine whether or not Heads of State,
Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, during their term of office, are
affected by the limitations or exceptions to immunity analysed above.”).
81. The Commission is currently soliciting information from states regarding how they
approach immunity. Sixty-Ninth Session (2017), INT’L LAW COMM’N (Mar. 2, 2018),
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/69/ [https://perma.cc/F8RK-DQNM].
82. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 129.
83. See id. paras. 36, 128.
84. See id. para. 125.
85. See id. paras. 127–28.
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Criminal Jurisdiction” has further explored the subject of immunity granted
to family members of a head of state.
C. Functional Immunity as It Applies to a Diplomatic Agent
The concept of immunity of state representatives dates back to ancient
times.86 The “bearers of messages from one leader to another were
sacrosanct” and “[t]his idea eventually grew to the practice we now know as
diplomatic inviolability and immunity.”87 Such privileges and immunities
enable diplomats “to act independently of any local pressures in negotiation,
to listen and speak on behalf of a foreign State while being themselves under
protection from attack or harassment,” and were accordingly “essential to the
conduct of relations between independent sovereign States.”88
It was not until the Congress of Vienna adopted the Regulation of March
19, 1815, however, that the international community began to codify
diplomatic law, including immunity from litigation or prosecution.89
Attempts at systematic codifications of the rules of diplomatic law continued
throughout the first half of the twentieth century but were unavailing.90
Finally, in 1961, the current international law on diplomatic immunity and
other privileges was codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations of 1961 (VCDR).91
Justification for the continuing tradition of diplomatic immunity is
grounded in three interrelated theories based on the history noted above:
(1) the concept of diplomats as foreign sovereign representatives; (2) the
notion of foreign sovereign persons as property, which meant that diplomats
and embassies were extraterritorial; and (3) the functional necessity of
86. See Wright, supra note 38, at 195–96 (“Diplomatic immunity is a doctrine dating as
far back as ancient India, Rome and the Greek city-state system. Islamic law from as early as
Mohammed also accorded diplomats immunity.”); Eileen Denza, Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L., http://legal.un.org/avl/ha/vcdr/
vcdr.html [https://perma.cc/CQ4G-YYFZ] (last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
87. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 94; see also id. at 94–95 nn.19–21.
88. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.4.
89. Documents of the Eighth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 133, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1.
90. See generally SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.5 (explaining that
the 1928 Havana Convention on Diplomatic Officers and the 1932 Harvard Research Draft
Convention on Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities were the two most important attempts
at establishing uniform rules of diplomatic law, but neither one of these efforts drew majority
support from the international community).
91. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. The
VCDR is currently ratified by 191 countries. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,
UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=
treaty&mtdsg_no=iii-3&chapter=3&lang=en [https://perma.cc/LV6R-2PWD] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2018). The privileges and immunities under the VCDR do not extend to consuls,
which are instead covered by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations of 1963. See
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Throughout
history, consuls have been viewed as “distinct in function and legal status from diplomatic
agents.” Thomas H. Lee, The Safe-Conduct Theory of the Alien Tort Statute, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 830, 884 (2006). The principle job of a consul is not diplomatic but commercial. Id. at
884–85 nn.273–74.
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guaranteeing protection to ensure reciprocity and sovereign-to-sovereign
dialogue.92 The functional necessity theory has emerged as the prevailing
modern basis for diplomatic immunity.93 Hence, this Note focuses on the
theory of functional necessity in its discussion.94 The functional necessity
theory “assumes that the absence of diplomatic immunity would lead to a
breakdown in the conduct of foreign relations.”95 If diplomats were to be
“liable to ordinary legal and political interference like other individuals, . . .
they might be influenced by personal considerations of safety and comfort to
a degree [that] would materially hamper them in the exercise of their
functions.”96 Therefore, the acts that a diplomat commits “as the arm or as
mouthpiece of the home state” are subject to immunity.97
When the Commission drafted the VCDR, it expressly stated in draft
commentary its intent to apply the theory of functional necessity.98 The
preamble to the VCDR also reflects this intent.99 Furthermore, article 39(2)
of the VCDR sets forth the concept of immunity ratione materiae to those
acts that are closely related to the fulfillment of diplomatic functions.100 As
a result, acts that diplomatic personnel commit and are not connected with
his or her official diplomatic functions are not entitled to immunity.101
The VCDR concerns diplomatic personnel and their families.102 A
diplomat is someone who is appointed by a national government to
“promot[e] friendly relations between the sending State and the receiving

92. Nina Maja Bergmar, Note, Demanding Accountability Where Accountability Is Due:
A Functional Necessity Approach to Diplomatic Immunity Under the Vienna Convention, 47
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 501, 507 (2014). The theory of representative of the sovereign grants
an individual diplomat the same privileges and immunities as that of the sending state. Id.
(explaining that the “theory of representative of the sovereign, also known as personal
representation, holds that ‘the representative’s privileges are similar to those of the sovereign
herself, and an insult to the ambassador is an insult to the dignity of the sovereign’” (quoting
Leslie Shirin Farhangi, Note, Insuring Against Abuse of Diplomatic Immunity, 38 STAN. L.
REV. 1517, 1520–21 (1986))). The theory of extraterritoriality holds that the civil and criminal
jurisdictions of the receiving state can never reach a diplomat because a diplomat cannot be
deemed to have ever left the sending state. Wright, supra note 38, at 197.
93. See SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 8.3 (“Modern practice and
theory have adopted this explanation of ‘functional need’ as the correct explanation of and
justification for diplomatic privileges and immunities.”).
94. For a discussion of the representative of the sovereign and extraterritoriality theories,
see Ross, supra note 39, at 177–78.
95. Wright, supra note 38, at 201.
96. OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 489.
97. See VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 36, at 106.
98. Documents of the Tenth Session Including the Report of the Commission to the
General Assembly, [1958] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 129, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.1.
99. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 96 (“Realizing that the
purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the
efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States . . . .”).
100. See id. at 118 (“[W]ith respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of
his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist.”).
101. See id.
102. See Justin M. Papka, The Grace Mugabe Incident: Defining Immunity and
Inviolability of Spouses of Heads of State, BSIS J. INT’L STUD., 2009, at 1, 5.
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State, and develop[] their economic, cultural and scientific relations.”103 The
VCDR defines four different categories of diplomatic personnel and
attributes varying degrees of diplomatic immunity to each category.104 These
categories are diplomatic agents, administrative and technical staff, service
staff, and private servants. The focus of this Note is the first category.105
A diplomatic agent is “the head of the mission or a member of the
diplomatic staff of the mission.”106 Under the VCDR, diplomatic agents are
granted absolute immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of a receiving
state—that is, they cannot be prosecuted for any official or private acts.107
However, diplomatic agents are subject to the civil jurisdiction of the
receiving state in certain cases.108
The family members of diplomatic agents are granted the same privileges
and immunities as diplomatic agents.109 Although the drafters of the VCDR
“abstained from determining criteria for members of the family,” they
emphasized that a spouse and the minor children of a diplomatic agent
constitute core family members who receive diplomatic immunity.110 The
drafters of the VCDR recognized the necessity of extending diplomatic
immunity to cover the acts of a diplomatic agent’s family members because
103. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 98 (noting that other
functions of a diplomatic mission include “representing the sending State in the receiving
State,” “protecting in the receiving State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals,
within the limits permitted by international law,” “negotiating with the Government of the
receiving State,” and “ascertaining by all lawful means conditions and developments in the
receiving State, and reporting thereon to the Government of the sending State”).
104. Ross, supra note 39, at 181.
105. The second category is the administrative and technical staff, which includes
“members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of
the mission.” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 98. Those who
fall into this category of diplomatic personnel and their family members enjoy blanket
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state. Id. at 116. However, immunity
from the civil jurisdiction of the receiving state is limited to the members of the administrative
and technical staff, and their family members, in that they only have immunity when it comes
to acts performed within the course of their duties. Id. The third category covers service staff,
which includes “members of the staff of the mission in the domestic service of the mission.”
Id. at 98. Members of the service staff “who are not nationals of or permanently resident in
the receiving State” enjoy immunity only with respect to the acts they perform in the course
of their duties. Id. at 116. The fourth and final category is the private servant, who “is a
person . . . in the domestic service of a member of the mission and who is not an employee of
the sending State.” Id. at 98. Private servants are only granted immunity “to the extent
admitted by the receiving State.” Id. at 116. The receiving state can only exercise its
jurisdiction over a private servant to the extent that it does not “interfere unduly with the
performance of the functions of the mission.” Id.
106. Id. at 98.
107. Id. at 112.
108. Id. (stating that a diplomatic agent is not entitled to immunity from a receiving state’s
civil jurisdiction for (1) “a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the
territory of the receiving State”; (2) “an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic
agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on
behalf of the sending State”; and (3) “an action relating to any professional or commercial
activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions”).
109. Id. at 116.
110. Mehmet Yavuz, Scope of Diplomatic Family in Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, 4 LAW & JUST. REV. 181, 192 (2013).
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the functions of a diplomatic agent would otherwise be impeded by pressure
if, for instance, his or her spouse or child was being criminally prosecuted by
the host nation’s law enforcement authorities.111
The VCDR accordingly grants absolute immunity from criminal
prosecution by the receiving state to members of a diplomatic agent’s
family.112 Otherwise, ambassadors would likely live in their stations alone
and leave their families behind.113 It is worth noting that states do have a
legitimate legal basis for extending diplomatic immunity to family members
of a diplomatic agent.
The above argument was made in an infamous case in the United States.
On November 29, 1982, Antonio F. Azeredo da Silveira Jr. shot Kenneth
Skeen at the Godfather nightclub in Washington, D.C.114 Silveira Jr. was
initially charged with shooting Skeen,115 but prosecution ceased because
diplomatic immunity was granted to Silveira Jr., the son of Brazil’s thenambassador to the United States.116 This grant of diplomatic immunity was
legally grounded in the Diplomatic Relations Act, the U.S. statute that
implements the VCDR.117 The U.S. Department of State’s guidance states
that the privileges and immunities under the VCDR are essential because
“foreign representatives can carry out their duties effectively only if they are
accorded a certain degree of insulation from the application of standard law
enforcement practices of the host country.”118 The same view was applied
when U.S. State Department official Richard Gookin expressed in a letter to
111. Summary Records of the Tenth Session, [1958] 1 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 162, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1958 (“Lastly, unless the members of a diplomatic agent’s family
enjoyed immunity, pressure could be brought to bear on the diplomatic agent through his
family.”).
112. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 112 (“A diplomatic
agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State.”).
113. Whether such blanket immunity is subject to abuse when it is granted to members of
a diplomatic agent’s family is beyond the scope of this Note. For a discussion on abuse of
diplomatic immunity, see Eirwen-Jane Pierrot, Escaping Diplomatic Impunity: The Case for
Diplomatic Law Reform, B. COUNCIL (Oct. 2010), http://www.barcouncil.org.uk/
media/61895/eirwen-jane_pierrot__42_.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CBD-AFFM].
114. Eric Pianin, Bounds of Diplomatic Immunity, WASH. POST (Aug. 5, 1987),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1987/08/05/bounds-of-diplomaticimmunity/5d050b31-cb14-43b4-b28e-eb5634e8faed [https://perma.cc/U67U-8D5M].
115. Brazil and Ambassador’s Son Face Lawsuit over Shooting, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
1982), http://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/12/us/brazil-and-ambassador-s-son-face-lawsuitover-shooting.html [https://perma.cc/9NGM-XJN2].
116. Pianin, supra note 114.
117. Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254a(4) (2012) (“[VCDR] entered into force
with respect to the United States on December 13, 1972.”). The United States enforces the
provisions of the VCDR through its Diplomatic Relations Acts that it enacted in 1978. See
generally Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-393, 92 Stat. 808 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 22, 28 U.S.C.); Bergmar, supra note 92, at 504 (“The VCDR,
which is a non self-executing treaty, gained legal force in the United States through the
enactment of the Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978, in which Congress ‘established the Vienna
Convention as the sole U.S. law governing diplomatic privileges and immunities.’” (quoting
LINDA S. FREY & MARSHA L. FREY, THE HISTORY OF DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY 490 (1999))).
118. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF FOREIGN MISSIONS, DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR
IMMUNITY: GUIDANCE FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES 4 (2015),
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/150546.pdf [https://perma.cc/SK7T-RY2N].
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Skeen that “it is not fair to conclude that diplomatic immunity as a concept
is not legitimate or that the laws concerning immunity need be changed.”119
A state’s decision to extend immunity to a diplomatic agent is premised in
large part on reciprocity—the expectation that its diplomatic agents will be
treated in the same manner when they are in a foreign state.120 A diplomatic
agent and members of his or her family who enter the territory of a foreign
state subject themselves to the laws of that state.121 Hence, only that state,
as a formal matter, holds the power to grant jurisdictional immunity, which
protects a diplomatic agent and his family from “being subject to the power
and authority of a [foreign state’s] court to hear and decide a judicial
proceeding.”122 The sending state may waive diplomatic immunity pursuant
to article 32 of the VCDR.123 This rarely happens. And when the sending
state refuses to do so, the receiving state could in theory declare “the head of
the mission or any member of the diplomatic staff of the mission” persona
non grata and order him or her out of the country.124 Nevertheless, states
rarely declare a diplomatic agent or his or her family members personae non
gratae because doing so could create tension between the receiving state and
the sending state, which could possibly lead to reciprocal retaliation.125
II. HOW STATES HAVE GRANTED AND LIMITED IMMUNITY
TO MEMBERS OF A HEAD OF STATE’S FAMILY
The extent of head-of-state immunity under customary international law is
unclear; the extent of immunity for members of a head of state’s family is
necessarily also unsettled. A host state may voluntarily declare a family
member immune to avoid rocking the boat—not out of a sense of legal
obligation but on the basis of international comity.126 When a family member

119. Pianin, supra note 114.
120. See SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 93 n.9 (“States accord each other’s representatives
immunity on a reciprocal basis . . . .”); Mallory, supra note 62, at 169.
121. See Mallory, supra note 62, at 169.
122. See id. at 170 n.3.
123. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 112 (explaining that a
waiver of diplomatic immunity by the sending state must always be express). However, states
are typically unwilling to waive diplomatic immunity, “even in cases where the cost of doing
so would be minimal.” Bergmar, supra note 92, at 506.
124. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 102.
125. See Bergmar, supra note 92, at 506 (“Although a persona non grata procedure appears
simple, it is rarely used in practice. Fear of reciprocity and disrupted diplomatic relationships
weigh in favor of simply absorbing the costs of misdeeds.”); see also, e.g., Ross, supra note
39, at 188, 202–03 (“The main practical reason cited for continuing diplomatic immunity in
the face of constant abuse of the privilege is the political reality of reciprocity. Some
commentators fear direct foreign governmental responses in the form of fabricated charges
against United States foreign service officers abroad if the United States prosecuted foreign
diplomats at home.”).
126. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 128 (“The view that, if the members of the family of a
Head of State are also granted immunity, it is on the basis only of international comity and not
of international law was supported in the resolution of the Institute of International Law.”).
The Institute of International Law is a private organization composed of leading international
lawyers who present resolutions to governmental authorities, international organizations, and
the scientific community to facilitate the development of international law. About the Institute,
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arrives in the receiving state as part of the head of state’s entourage during
an official visit, or is acting in his or her own official capacity, extending the
same privileges and immunities as are extended to a head of state seems more
in line with a legal obligation.127 However, exempting members of a head of
state’s family from “the authority and jurisdiction of the state which they are
visiting” for private acts sounds more in the realm of a policy choice.128
Nevertheless, even in such cases, many states have asserted that they are
granting immunity from prosecution to members of a head of state’s family,
and one could assert that the commonality of the practice has attained the
status of customary international law. This Part presents cases that
demonstrate how states have addressed whether to grant immunity to a
member of a head of state’s family in light of concerns of international comity
and impeding the function of a head of state. Part II.A discusses cases where
states have limited immunity for members of a head of state’s family to
official acts. In contrast, Part II.B examines cases in which states have
granted immunity to family members of a head of state for private acts.
A. To Grant, or Not to Grant, “How Official” Is the Question:
Extending Immunity to Members of
a Head of State’s Family for Official Acts
As discussed above, head-of-state immunity is founded upon the
fundamental concept of sovereign immunity that “the state and its ruler [are]
one.”129 States hesitate to exercise their jurisdiction over the representatives
of other states out of respect for sovereignty and a desire for reciprocal
respect.130 This undergirds grants of immunity ratione materiae to members
of a head of state’s family for acts committed in an official capacity.
This principle was illustrated in a U.S. case involving Prince Charles of
Great Britain, who, at the time as now, was the son and heir apparent of
Queen Elizabeth II.131 A U.S. district court dismissed a civil complaint
brought against Prince Charles for acts that he allegedly committed during a
state visit to the United States.132 In October 1977, Prince Charles embarked
on a thirteen-day trip to the United States and was scheduled to visit ten cities,
including Cleveland, Ohio.133 In Ohio, Prince Charles was “to address a
special convocation called to dedicate the building housing Cleveland State

INSTITUT DE DROIT INT’L, http://www.idi-iil.org/en/a-propos/ [https://perma.cc/4STG-MU2Q]
(last visited Apr. 13, 2018).
127. See OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 73, § 453.
128. See id.
129. Mallory, supra note 62, at 170.
130. See Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 96 n.184; see also supra Part I.B.
131. Janice Williams, Will Queen Elizabeth Give Prince Charles the Throne in 2018?,
NEWSWEEK (Dec. 28, 2017, 12:05 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/queen-elizabeth-princecharles-retirement-762110 [https://perma.cc/3DNS-VHGL].
132. See Kilroy v. Windsor, No. C 78-291, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 7, 1978).
133. Roy Reed, Charles, A Dashing Prince, Is Likely to Charm U.S. on Visit, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 15, 1977), http://www.nytimes.com/1977/10/15/archives/charles-a-dashing-prince-islikely-to-charm-us-on-visit.html [https://perma.cc/7T3M-BW75].
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University’s Cleveland-Marshall College of Law.”134 Just as Prince Charles
was preparing to address his audience, third-year law student Jack Kilroy,
stood up and asked the Prince, “I would like to know when England is going
to stop torturing political prisoners?”135 Kilroy was subsequently escorted
out by security guards.136
In 1978, a year later, Kilroy filed a civil complaint against Prince Charles
for alleged deprivation of “various rights guaranteed by the Constitution and
laws of the United States.”137 In response to Kilroy’s complaint, the U.S.
Attorney General, upon the recommendation of the State Department, filed a
suggestion of immunity with the court.138 The State Department made the
suggestion, despite the fact that Prince Charles was a member of Queen
Elizabeth II’s family and not yet Great Britain’s head of state, on the view
that the acts he allegedly committed were performed in his official
capacity.139 The district court agreed with the State Department and reasoned
that immunity “applies with even more force to live persons representing a
foreign nation on an official visit.”140 Declining to grant immunity in such a
case would not only deter future visits by a head of state’s family members
but would also “possibly offend[ the] nation.”141 The court relied heavily on
the fact that Prince Charles was in Cleveland on official business, not for
personal reasons.
The Austrian Supreme Court of Justice applied similar logic when it
refused to grant immunity to the siblings of the reigning Prince Hans-Adam
II of Liechtenstein. In 2001, an Austrian citizen identified as Anita W.
brought suit against the Prince, his sister, and his two brothers seeking a
declaratory judgment that would establish affiliation between her and the
siblings’ father.142 The court held that Prince Hans-Adam II was entitled
under customary international law to absolute immunity as the head of state
with respect to both official and private functions.143 However, the court
held that the Prince’s siblings were not entitled to the same immunity.144 The
court reasoned that the Prince’s siblings “were not close members of the
family of the Head of State forming part of his household” and were,

134. W. James Van Vliet et al., Irish Ire Cooled by Royal Reserve: Student Asks Prince
About Ulster Torture, PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 21, 1977, at 8-A.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Kilroy, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, at *1.
138. Id. at *2 (explaining that a determination of immunity “by the Executive Branch of
our government, pursuant to its primacy over questions of foreign policy and the conduct of
international affairs, is binding and not reviewable in this or any court”).
139. See id. at *3 (explaining that the U.S. Department of State reasoned that it granted
Prince Charles immunity because his visit was a special diplomatic mission and he was
therefore considered an official diplomatic envoy during his visit to the United States).
140. Id. at *2–3.
141. See id. at *3.
142. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Feb. 14, 2001, 7 Ob 316/00x, 74
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES ÖSTERREICHISCHEN OBERSTEN GERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [SZ]
No. 20 (Austria) (Oxford Public International Law, Oxford Reports on International Law).
143. Id.
144. Id.
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therefore, not “entitled to immunity under customary international law.”145
In addition, the court recognized that the case before it concerned a private
function that did not affect the Prince’s public and constitutional position.146
As a result, the court’s refusal to grant immunity to the Prince’s siblings did
not impede any official functions of the head of state, and respect for
sovereignty remained intact.
Likewise, the Civil Court of Brussels refused to extend immunity to the
wife and children of the former President of Zaire. In 1988, former President
Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga asked the Brussels court to
vacate an attachment on his family’s property in Belgium that was granted
upon request by Cotoni, an agriculture company.147 Former President
Mobutu argued that he and his family enjoyed head-of-state immunity from
“both civil and criminal jurisdiction, whether or not the acts in question fall
within the framework of the exercise of their official duties.”148 The court
rejected then-President Mobutu’s argument and did not recognize immunity
for the members of his family.149 The court reasoned that unlike the former
President Mobutu, who would be entitled to head-of-state immunity under
customary international law, his wife and children “could not rely on a rule
of immunity from jurisdiction.”150 Furthermore, the court noted that headof-state immunity only covered official acts as the actual head of state.151
Nevertheless, the court vacated the attachment on the separate, nonimmunity
ground that former President Mobutu and his family could not be held
personally liable to pay debt that “was clearly the responsibility of a company
properly constituted under the law of Zaire.”152
B. First Ladies and Their Private Acts: Extending Immunity
to Members of a Head of State’s Family for Private Acts
While there have been instances in which states limited immunity for
members of a head of state’s family to acts committed in official functions,153
there have also been cases where states have granted immunity to family
145. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 126.
146. See JOANNE FOAKES, THE POSITION OF HEADS OF STATE AND SENIOR OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 91 (2014) (“The court held that . . . questions of personal and family
(including marital) status belong exclusively to the private life of a head of State, particularly
in the present case where the question of family status related to the head of State’s father
rather than directly to the head of State himself and did not affect the latter’s public and
constitutional position.”).
147. Mobutu v. SA Cotoni, [Civ.] [Civil Court of Brussels], Dec. 29, 1988, Jurisprudence
de Liège, Mons et Bruxelles [JLMB] 1989, 169 (Belg.), reprinted in 91 I.L.R. 259, 259 (1993).
At the time, SA Cotoni was a company “involved in agriculture and livestock breeding.”
Belgian Court Seizes Mobutu Properties, UPI (Dec. 21, 1988), https://www.upi.com/
Archives/1988/12/21/Belgian-court-seizes-Mobutu-properties/5862598683600/
[https://perma.cc/3VF6-VGGZ].
148. Mobutu, 91 I.L.R. at 260.
149. Id. at 260–61.
150. VAN ALEBEEK, supra note 36, at 184.
151. See Mobutu, 91 I.L.R. at 260 (explaining that head-of-state immunity “can only
benefit [former President Mobutu] as the bearer of the title of Head of State”).
152. Id. at 259.
153. See supra Part II.A.
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members for private acts. Such grants of immunity have often been invoked
when concerns about foreign relations outweighed concerns of whether the
act was committed in an official function.
In Kline v. Kaneko,154 a U.S. court extended immunity to a head of state’s
family member despite acknowledging that the conduct at issue involved a
private act.155 In 1988, Rukmini Sukarno Kline sued the first lady of Mexico,
Paloma Cordero de De la Madrid, for causing her “false imprisonment and
abduction . . . from her Mexico City apartment.”156 The case was filed in
state court but was removed to federal court before it was remanded back to
state court to determine whether the case would be dismissed against De la
Madrid on grounds of immunity.157 The State Department filed a suggestion
of immunity for De la Madrid upon request by the Mexican government.158
The New York Supreme Court subsequently dismissed the case against
Mexico’s then-first lady pursuant to the suggestion of immunity.159 The state
court echoed the federal court’s finding that De la Madrid’s “alleged conduct
was carried out exclusively in a private capacity.”160 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that it was the “court’s duty” to dismiss the case so as not to
“interfere with the executive’s proper handling of foreign affairs.”161 Thus,
the New York court strongly implied that the discretionary dismissal was a
matter of international comity, not a legal obligation.
The long and corrupt tenure of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos and
his infamously profligate wife Imelda spawned a welter of litigation in
multiple jurisdictions that resulted in important immunity holdings. Even
after the two were ousted from their country by prodemocracy opposition,162
they were dogged by accusations of having diverted large amounts of money
belonging to the Philippine government.163 One instance involved the
Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland’s recognition of immunity for both
Marcos and his wife in response to U.S. requests for discovery assistance
with respect to purloined assets suspected to be stashed in Swiss bank

154. 685 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
155. Id. at 388.
156. Id.
157. Kline v. Kaneko, 535 N.Y.S.2d 303, 304–05 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
158. Id. at 305.
159. Id.
160. Kline, 685 F. Supp. at 393. Compare id., with Kline, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 305 (describing
how immunity did not “extend to Mrs. De la Madrid because she held no official position
within the government.”).
161. Kline, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 304 (emphasis added) (quoting Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614,
616 (5th Cir. 1974)).
162. See Tracie A. Sundack, Republic of Philippines v. Marcos: The Ninth Circuit Allows
a Former Ruler to Invoke the Act of State Doctrine Against a Resisting Sovereign, 38 AM. U.
L. REV. 225, 241–42 (1988).
163. For a discussion on how Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos allegedly spent government
funds, see Amy Qin, Hunt for Missing Marcos Art Seeks to Regain Momentum, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/arts/design/hunt-for-missing-marcosart-seeks-to-regain-momentum.html [https://perma.cc/WGP2-28NU].
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accounts.164 In pursuing a criminal matter against the former President and
first lady, the U.S. Public Prosecutor for the State of New York, acting
through the U.S. Department of Justice, requested mutual assistance from the
Swiss Federal Office of Police.165 Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos objected to
the grant of this request before the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland on
the ground of head-of-state immunity.166 The Swiss court agreed and upheld
immunity for both Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos despite their alleged and
paradigmatically private acts—stealing government funds.167
Consider again the case elaborated in the Introduction regarding the South
African government’s invocation of immunity for the now-former first lady
of Zimbabwe after she assaulted a model with an extension cord.168 Was the
immunity granted diplomatic immunity? The VCDR has force of law in
South Africa under section 2(1) of South Africa’s Diplomatic Immunities and
Privileges Act.169 The VCDR defines a diplomatic agent as “the head of the
mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission.”170 A diplomatic
agent enjoys blanket immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving
state under article 31(1) of the VCDR.171 Article 37(1) of the VCDR extends
this to “members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his
household.”172
Grace Mugabe was not in South Africa as the head of a mission or as a
member of the diplomatic staff of a mission at the time of attack on Engels.173
Her husband, former President Robert Mugabe, confirmed that the purpose
of her visit to South Africa was for medical consultation over an injured
leg.174 However, following her attack on Engels, Grace Mugabe claimed that

164. Marcos v. Fed. Dep’t of Police, Tribunal fédéral [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Nov. 2, 1989,
155 ARRÊTS DE TRIBUNAL FÉDÉRAL SUISSE (RECUEIL OFFICIEL) [ATF] Ib 533, reprinted in 102
I.L.R. 198, 198–99 (1989).
165. Marcos, 102 I.L.R. at 199. The United States and Switzerland signed a treaty on May
25, 1973, that obligates the states to help each other obtain information for criminal matters.
Id.
166. Id. at 200.
167. Papka, supra note 102, at 9–10 (explaining that the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that
immunity for a head of state is absolute and it also covers the private activities of the head of
state).
168. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
169. Diplomatic Immunities and Privileges Act 37 of 2001 §§ 2–3 (S. Afr.) (“The [VCDR],
1961, applies to all diplomatic missions and members of such missions in the Republic.”).
170. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 98; see supra Part II.C.
171. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 112; see also supra
Part II.C.
172. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 91, at 116; Simba Mubvuma,
Diplomatic Immunity for Grace Mugabe?, LINKEDIN (Aug. 18, 2017),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/diplomatic-immunity-grace-mugabe-simba-mubvuma
[https://perma.cc/9UBN-NFSA]; see also Shoeshoe Malisa, Warranted or Not?: Diplomatic
Immunity and Grace Mugabe, LEGAL AFR. (Sept. 27, 2017, 10:03 PM),
http://www.legalafrican.com/articles/2017/09/warranted-or-not-diplomatic-immunity-andgrace-mugabe/ [https://perma.cc/66YX-G2D9]; supra Part II.C.
173. See Bornman, supra note 8.
174. Moyo, supra note 12 (“President Mugabe, speaking during a recent party rally in
Gwanda, in Zimbabwe’s Matabeleland Province, said his wife had gone to South Africa for a
medical consultation over her leg, which had been injured in a freak accident.”).
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the purpose of her visit to South Africa was to attend the regional summit
held by the Southern African Development Community,175 an event Grace
Mugabe did not attend.176
Furthermore, Grace Mugabe was not entitled to diplomatic immunity as
former President Robert Mugabe’s spouse because he was in South Africa as
the head of state of Zimbabwe, not as a diplomatic agent. The summit hosted
by the Southern African Development Community is an annual gathering of
regional heads of state and of government.177 A document published by the
Southern African Development Community on its website after the summit
lists then-President Robert Mugabe as one of the attendees among other
heads of state who were in attendance.178 Based on these facts, the protection
extended to family members of a diplomatic agent under article 37(1) of the
VCDR plainly does not extend to Grace Mugabe.179 The VCDR “does not
deal with the personal privileges and immunities of the head of state.”180 In
sum, the VCDR or diplomatic immunity generally does not extend to the
facts of South Africa’s grant of diplomatic immunity to Grace Mugabe.
III. FOREIGN IMMUNITY FOR A HEAD OF STATE’S FAMILY MEMBERS
SHOULD BE LIMITED TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY RATIONE MATERIAE
The reason for extending absolute immunity to a head of state does not
apply to his or her family members, and so they warrant only qualified
immunity for official acts. The head of state “is seen as personifying the
sovereign State and the immunity to which he [or she] was entitled is
predicated on status.”181 But this logic does not apply to family members;
nor do the practical reciprocity policy reasons extend with equal force since
diplomatic family members live for extended periods in the receiving
country.
As an intermediary position, this rationale could apply to the spouse of a
head of state who accompanies the head of state on an official visit to a
foreign country. When the spouse and the head of state arrive together in a
175. Anita Powell, Alleged Assault by Grace Mugabe in South Africa Becomes Diplomatic
Headache, VOICE AM. (Aug. 17, 2017, 4:21 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/zimbabwpresident-mugabe-in-south-africa-after-wife-is-accused-of-assault/3989445.html
[https://perma.cc/T5AW-7QFG].
176. Grace Mugabe Returns Home Pursued by South Africa Assault Allegation, REUTERS
(Aug. 20, 2017, 4:43 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-mugabe/grace-mugabereturns-home-pursued-by-south-africa-assault-allegation-idUSKCN1B007S
[https://perma.cc/929P-MLB7] (“President Mugabe attended a South African Development
Community (SADC) summit in Pretoria on Saturday, but his 52-year-old wife was not there
or part of his delegation.”).
177. See Dep’t of Int’l Relations & Cooperation, S. African Dev. Cmty., Communiqué of
the 37th Summit SADC of Heads of State and Government or Tambo Building 1 (Aug. 20,
2017),
http://www.sadc.int/files/4715/0347/1755/37th_SADC_Summit_English_
Communique.pdf [https://perma.cc/FT48-2HGF].
178. Id. at 1–2. The document appears to list the names of attendees in the order of the
attendees’ status, beginning with heads of state and government, vice presidents, prime
ministers, and ministers of foreign affairs. Id.
179. See supra note 172.
180. SATOW’S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE, supra note 41, § 12.1.
181. Kolodkin, supra note 21, para. 92 n.171.
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foreign state on official business, the two are viewed as one unit representing
the sovereign state. Subjecting the spouse, who is fulfilling an official duty,
to criminal or civil liability could interfere with the function of the head of
state because the couple is recognized as a unit. Moreover, there are instances
in which the spouse could be carrying out an official function by furthering
diplomacy on behalf of his or her country.182 Therefore, in instances where
the spouse of a head of state is accompanying the head of state on an official
visit and is fulfilling an official function, it would be appropriate to extend
immunity to the spouse.
But even when the act in question has been committed in a private capacity
and not in the fulfillment of an official function, states have granted immunity
to members of a head of state’s family, particularly to first ladies.183 As the
New York court’s opinion suggests,184 however, this is done as a matter of
discretionary international comity, not law.185 The bottom-line rationale is
reciprocity—a favor to the other state with hopes that such favor will be
returned in the future.186 When host governments such as South Africa
characterize grants as legally compelled, they risk diluting the general logic
for the immunities and disables justice for victims who are often host-nation
citizens. Specifically, granting absolute immunity to a first lady suggests that
she has a function that is equivalent to that of a head of state, which is not
true. A head of state is entitled to absolute immunity ratione personae
because he or she is considered the personification of the sovereign state.187
Diplomatic agents were historically granted absolute immunity ratione
personae under the theory that they represented the sovereign state, but such
absolute immunity has been reduced to qualified immunity ratione
materiae.188 This restriction makes sense in light of the fact that diplomatic
agents, unlike heads of state, are not embodiments of the sovereign state itself
but act only as an arm or mouthpiece of the state.189 The function of a first
lady is closer to that of a diplomatic agent than that of a head of state because
her position does not symbolize the state itself. Therefore, it is more
appropriate for a first lady to be entitled to qualified immunity ratione
materiae for official conduct, not for private acts.

182. See, e.g., Barbara Maranzani, A First Lady Brings a French Icon to American Shores,
HISTORY (Jan. 8, 2013), https://www.history.com/news/a-first-lady-brings-a-french-icon-toamerican-shores [https://perma.cc/3TVS-8MZD] (explaining how President Charles de Gaulle
was not impressed with President John F. Kennedy during his visit to France but was
impressed with First Lady Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis, who quickly built rapport with
President de Gaulle during her visit).
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. See supra note 160.
185. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
186. See George, supra note 62, at 1061 (explaining that under the doctrine of comity, states
grant immunity to the official of a foreign state so that its own state officials will be treated
the same way when they are in the foreign state and that “[c]omity is also closely related to
such policies as protecting the dignity of foreign governments and safeguarding mutual respect
among nations”).
187. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 87–88, 93 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 97.
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Moreover, limiting a first lady’s immunity to qualified immunity ratione
materiae does not necessarily impede the functions of her official position.
When Grace Mugabe attacked Engels, she was not acting in an official
capacity as a diplomatic agent on a diplomatic mission.190 She was acting in
her private capacity as a mother on a personal mission to reprimand her two
sons for their bad behavior.191 The former first lady’s pursuit of her private
mission made Engels a victim of the first lady’s private conduct.192 If Grace
Mugabe were to have been subject to South Africa’s criminal jurisdiction as
a result of her behavior, this would not have necessarily impeded her official
duties as first lady. Although Grace Mugabe later changed her story to make
it appear as if she were in South Africa to carry out her official duties as first
lady,193 her own husband had already confirmed that she was in South Africa
for medical treatment.194 Even if the altered story were true, subjecting
Grace Mugabe to South Africa’s criminal jurisdiction would not have
changed the outcome of her so-called “official visit” because she failed to
attend the regional summit even after diplomatic immunity was granted.195
As exemplified in the incident between Grace Mugabe and Engels, allowing
immunity of first ladies for acts committed in their private capacity and not
in the furtherance of an official duty only encourages abuse of power.196
Refusing immunity for the private acts of a first lady is also unlikely to
interfere with the official functions of a head of state in a way that the law
should countenance. One commentator, Justin Papka, poses a hypothetical
outcome to the incident of Grace Mugabe beating a photographer for
snapping a photo of her during a shopping spree in Hong Kong.197 If Hong
Kong were to prosecute Grace Mugabe for assault, her husband might have
been distracted from his official duties as President of Zimbabwe. From a
logical standpoint, this could have disrupted Zimbabwe’s internal affairs, and
it also might have damaged Zimbabwe’s relations with China.198 Papka
concludes that the chance of these consequences is remote.199 But even if
they were likely, the answer is that it should be up to China to let Grace
Mugabe leave and escape prosecution as a policy choice and a matter of
sovereign grace, not legal obligation.
As a general matter, there has been a movement away from absolute
immunity and toward qualified immunity in both civil and criminal contexts,
190. See supra note 173.
191. See supra note 173.
192. See supra notes 8–13 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 175.
194. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
196. See, e.g., Papka, supra note 102, at 1–2 (explaining that Hong Kong granted Grace
Mugabe diplomatic immunity to protect her from prosecutorial proceedings after she violently
beat a photographer during a personal shopping trip).
197. See id. at 12–17.
198. See id.
199. See id. at 17 (“Based on the case facts, when assessing the potential costs to state
relations between the Hong Kong SAR and Zimbabwe, or the possible threat to Zimbabwe’s
executive office or national security; there does not appear to be a reasonable legal necessity
or probability of threat to either nation.”).
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with a focus on balancing respect for sovereignty with interests of justice and
individual rights.200 State immunity, for instance, has evolved from absolute
to none whatsoever with respect to commercial activities carried on by
sovereign entities in foreign jurisdictions.201
Furthermore, in recent years, some in the international community have
argued for abolishing head-of-state blanket immunity from criminal
jurisdiction in other countries for grave international human rights law
violations,202 such as the 1984 Convention on Torture.203 If the country itself
has ratified the treaty, then it cannot possibly be justified as a sovereign act
and so the act could only have been committed in the individual’s private
capacity.204
The immunity of a member of a head of state’s family should be similarly
restricted. While there are instances in which family members of a head of
state serve as embodiments of the sovereign official, and must therefore be
granted immunity,205 that determination should be made after considering the
potential injustice that may result from a grant of immunity. Upholding
respect for the sovereignty of a state may become the less attractive option
depending on the seriousness of the act and the capacity in which the act was
committed.206 A state’s grant of immunity to a member of a head of state’s
family for a private act that has no connection with the fulfillment of an
official function should be clearly identified and justified as a policy decision,
not a legal obligation.207
CONCLUSION
Heads of state, particularly in the developing world, are often fabulously
wealthy and lead lives of which their people can only dream. It has become
common for the family members of heads of state—including wives,
children, and grandchildren—to travel to foreign countries to obtain an
education, shop, travel, eat, and play in sparkling cities that often stand in
stark contrast to their homes. When these family members commit crimes or
act in ways that cause injury, the legal presumption should be that they are
liable or prosecutable. True, a lawsuit may seem to be a sham, a grudge, or
even a shakedown. If so, the host government is at liberty to dismiss the suit
or allow the implicated family member to leave the country for the sake of

200. See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
201. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012).
202. Cf. Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Precedent and Universal Jurisdiction, 35 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 311, 315 (2001) (discussing the Spanish court’s prosecution of Chile’s exdictator, General Augusto Pinochet, pursuant to Spanish judicial law that permits universal
jurisdiction over heads of state for heinous crimes and how “transactional prosecutions can
catalyze domestic prosecutions”).
203. See REBECCA M.M. WALLACE & OLGA MARTIN-ORTEGA, INTERNATIONAL LAW 148
(6th ed. 2009).
204. SIMBEYE, supra note 30, at 129.
205. See Kilroy v. Windsor, No. C 78-291, 1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20419, at *1 (N.D. Ohio
Dec. 7, 1978).
206. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 127–28.
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harmonious relations. But to act or even imply that immunity in such
instances is an obligation of customary international law, whether as a part
of diplomatic or head-of-state immunity, is not only inaccurate—it risks
undermining respect for those bona fide immunities and the reasons for
which they exist. When the South African public saw Grace Mugabe get off
scot-free because of “diplomatic immunity,” many likely perceived
diplomatic immunity as a joke or a gross inequity. And what of the victim?
Does the state not have a duty to protect the interests of its people, as well as
a duty to ensure peaceful international relations? The language of law
deployed as justification here is dangerous and should be curtailed. The
proper balance is to recognize that the family members of heads of state have
immunity when traveling to foreign countries on official business for their
official acts but not for their private acts. Just as the international community
has come to accept nonimmunity for the commercial activities of foreign
sovereigns, it should acknowledge nonimmunity for the private activities of
family members of foreign heads of state.

